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We extend Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)[11] model to a dynamic
context where we study how the bank's ¯nancial stability is a®ected
by successive withdrawal shocks during a crisis. We model a crisis as a
series of these unanticipated events over a long period of time and not
as isolated bank runs. We highlight the importance of banks' portfo-
lio liquidity in surviving such crisis. The paper shows that external
borrowing can smooth investment returns to guarantee that solvent
but illiquid intermediaries can survive a crisis. In the presence of
borrowing restrictions banks' liquidity exhibits an erratic behaviour.
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11 Introduction
Bank runs are recurrent phenomena of considerable economic signi¯cance
and historically they have been of major concern in the conduct of monetary
policy. Runs can lead to bank failures, disruption of credit, and in most situ-
ations add a downward pressure to the real economy. Over the recent years,
much work has been done, both theoretical and empirical, in examining the
determinants of bank runs and institutional arrangements have been devel-
oped to avert the possibility of such events to occur. However, runs have
been modelled in the literature as static phenomena and not as frequently
recurring events. Indeed, some empirical research suggests that the banking
sector has frequently experienced multiple run episodes over a given period
of time. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996)[9] show that, from a sample of ninety
episodes since 1970s, the average length of a bank crisis was 4.5 years. In this
respect, the main contribution of this paper to the existing literature is the
formulation of a model of banking crisis where successive withdrawal shocks
take place over a long time interval. We use a three-period overlapping gen-
erations model to study the e®ects of a banking crisis on banks' liquidity,
and as a consequence, on their solvency and survival. The paper shows that
access to external borrowing plays an important role in the ¯nancial stability
of the banking system. The cost of borrowing and the desired level of liquid-
ity reserve holdings during the run episodes give a rise to di®erent transition
paths of equilibrium allocations during the course of the crisis.
The basic setup that we employ in this model is based Diamond and Dy-
bvig's (1983)[11] framework which highlights the importance of asset trans-
formation function of intermediaries in providing liquidity insurance to de-
positors, and explains their vulnerability to runs. In particular, in their
seminal paper they focus on the liability side of the bank's balance sheet in
a single-generation three-period model where a private preference shock is
uncorrelated across agents, and the economy's productive technology has a
long-term maturity. In this setting, the bank by pooling deposits can diver-
sify risk so that the demand deposit contracts can provide liquidity insurance
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competitive outcome. The one-sided asymmetry of information prevents the
use of the standard Arrow-Debreu insurance contracts since the contracts
can not be conditioned on depositors' privately observed preference shock.
Therefore, when depositors' incentives are not distorted, the demand deposit
contract can achieve the optimal risk-sharing equilibrium as a pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium. However, banks by providing liquidity become illiquid
themselves. Another Nash-equilibrium may arise which is Pareto-inferior and
is described as bank run. If depositors panic due to a commonly observed
exogenous factor (\sunspot") and rush to withdraw their deposits, then the
bank will not be able to honour all its liabilities and will ¯nally fail. Bank
runs are viewed as self-ful¯lling prophecies where the public thinks that the
bank is going to fail, and by rationally running to withdraw their funds it
actually fails.
The literature pioneered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983)[11] has been
primarily focused on the determinants of bank runs, and alternative ways
to eliminate or reduce the possibility of the bank run equilibrium have been
analysed. Similarly to Diamond and Dybvig (1983)[11] many authors have
developed single-generation three-period models where they viewed bank
runs as self-ful¯lling prophecies (Smith (1984)[20], Engineer (1989)[13], Cooper
and Ross (1998)[10] among others.). Others view bank runs as related to busi-
ness cycle (Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)[18], Alonso (1996)[4], Alen and
Gale (1998)[2] among others.). They argued that runs are triggered by de-
positors who receive information about an impending downturn in the cycle
and withdraw their funds because they anticipate that the bank's portfolio of
assets will not yield su±cient returns to meet their legitimate demands due to
the low value of the fundamentals. An alternative approach has been intro-
duced by Jacklin (1987)[17] and extended by Haubrich and King (1990)[16].
They show that the allocations that can be achieved through direct trading
of ¯rms' shares with a predetermined divided policy, or by ¯nancial institu-
tions that issue tradeable securities (i.e. mutual funds), can provide the same
liquidity insurance as depository intermediaries that issue standard debt con-
3tracts, and in addition, are free of bank runs.
Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)[11] model has also been extended to the
realm of overlapping generations. This literature has focused on examining
the respective roles of capital markets and ¯nancial intermediaries in pro-
viding liquidity insurance but little has been done in analysing bank runs.
More speci¯cally, in comparison to the single-generation three-period mod-
els, intergenerational transfers enable banks to invest a greater proportion
of deposits in less liquid but more productive technology, and provide de-
positors with greater liquidity insurance. The intertemporal stock market
allocation is dominated by the intermediated allocation, but these alloca-
tions become identical when an interbank market is introduced to the inter-
mediated economy (Dutta and Karpur (1994)[12] and Fulghieri and Rovelli
(1998)[15]). In this case, government intervention in the stock market can
lead to second-best superior allocations (Bhattacharya and Padilla (1996)[6]).
When uncertainty on the returns of the productive technology is introduced,
an in¯nitely lived bank can achieve intertemporal smoothing of the returns
of the risky technology whereas the competitive market can only achieve an
intergenerational risk-sharing, and therefore is dominated (Allen and Gale
(1997)[2]). The transition towards the Golden Rule steady state allocation
can been modelled as a proposal game of generations between di®erent ¯nan-
cial con¯gurations (Bhattacharya et al [7](1998)). Intermediation promotes
economic growth by facilitating greater investment in the productive tech-
nology (Bencivenga and Smith (1991) [5]), but depositors' incentives may be
distorted in a continuous time framework (von Thadden (2002)[21]). How-
ever, the limited amount of work that has been done in this literature on
bank runs has modelled these shocks in a static way. First Bryant (1981)[8]
argues that, due to the intergenerational transfer of resources, in¯nitely lived
banks have a positive net worth and therefore are vulnerable to runs since
agents of a given generation can gain from its collapse. Ennis and Keister
(2003)[14] have developed an endogenous growth model where they show that
run-proof contracts can promote economic growth. Qi's (1994)[19] ¯ndings
suggest that apart from excessive withdrawals, bank runs in an intertemporal
4model can also occur due to a lack of new deposits.
In our attempt to model a banking crisis, similarly to Diamond and Dy-
bvig (1983)[11], we view bank runs as sunspot phenomena which can not be
anticipated by banks. Due to an extrinsic uncertainty that in°uences depos-
itors' beliefs about banks' solvency but is unrelated to economics fundamen-
tals, bank runs are triggered. In analysing bank runs in a dynamic context,
we do not consider these phenomena as isolated events, but we rather analyse
a banking crisis where successive bank runs take place over a time horizon
characterised by the loss of depositors' con¯dence in the banking system, and
therefore, by a turmoil in the banking sector. Starting from an intermediary
with prior assets and liabilities, we allow for a sequence of runs to take place
at regular time intervals, where the time interval between successive runs
represents a \cycle", where cycles can be of di®erent duration. The sequence
of the steady state equilibria that we obtain can only be sustained if an inter-
mediary relies periodically on the deposits made by the newborn generations
of agents. The basic setup that we use to compute these steady state alloca-
tions within each cycle is a generalisation of the methodology that employed
in Qi's (1994)[19] paper. However, in our model runs can not occur due to a
lack of new deposits since newborn agents can not observe or anticipate the
occurrence of a bank run. For this reason, we consider the following order
of events in each time period, irrespectively of whether a run takes place;
new deposits and withdrawals (standard or excess withdrawals due to a run)
are made ¯rst, and then banks make their investment decisions with the re-
maining resources. In this process, we are able derive the dynamics of our
model and describe the evolution of successive cycles' equilibrium allocations.
This myopic behaviour of newborn generations of agents implies that
banks can survive a run when excess withdrawals can be ¯nanced by new
deposits, and therefore, a withdrawal shock is not directly associated with a
bank failure, as in the three-period models. We start our analysis with the
condition that banks' ¯nancial stability is not severely damaged after experi-
encing the ¯rst run, so that intermediaries are still solvent but they become
5illiquid in order to remain competitive with respect to the new entrants in
the market. In order to simplify the analysis of the transitional dynamics
we consider that all the agents of a particular cycle are treated equally by
the banks. In this way, a \short-term" steady-state within each cycle can be
derived. Of course, when we consider the whole crisis, successive cycles over-
lap in the time period when a bank run is triggered. In accordance with the
unanticipated nature of runs, agents that were born at this time period are
treated as agents of the previous cycle. In the above setting, we analyse the
transition of banks' liquidity over di®erent cycles and we examine whether
intermediaries can survive the crisis by converging to a feasible allocation.
Our results show that the system converges to a feasible \long-term"
steady state when banks can smooth their portfolios' liquidity through ex-
ternal borrowing. The cost and the amount of borrowing determine the tran-
sition path towards these long-term allocations. We show that oscillations
and monotonic transitions, or even constant periodic movements between
successive equilibria, may arise. However, in the absence of such borrowing,
banks' liquidity position becomes unpredictable.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The next section describes the
model. In the third section we develop the planning problem of an inter-
generational bank. In the fourth and ¯fth sections we analyse the dynamics
of the model in the case where banks can obtain external borrowing from
a Central Bank, and in the presence of borrowing restrictions, respectively.
Finally, we conclude and discuss possible future extensions of our model in
section six.
2 The Model
We consider an in¯nite-horizon version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [11]
model. A new generation of agents, whose size is normalised to 1, is born in
each period and live for three periods. Each newborn agent is endowed with
1 unit of the economy's single homogeneous good and receive no endowment
6in the remaining two periods. Agents of each generation are identical ex-ante
at the time period they are born, and at the beginning of the middle period
of their life they \privately" observe a preference shock which is assumed
to be independently and identically distributed across agents. The shock
is such as agents may become impatient consumers with probability ¼, or
patient with probability 1¡¼. On aggregate, however, from the law of large
numbers the uncertainty is washed out and therefore the total number of
impatient and patient depositors is ex ante known, and it is ¼ and 1 ¡ ¼,
respectively. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) [11] we assume that impa-
tient agents derive utility of consumption only in the middle period of their
life, while patient depositors derive utility of consumption only in the last
period of their life. The assumption of corner preferences implies that agents
can consume only once in their lifetime, where U(Ct) denotes the utility de-
rived from the consumption of the commodity at period t (t = 1;2). The
utility function is assumed twice continuously di®erentiable, increasing and
strictly concave and to satisfy the Inada conditions: limCt!0 U0(Ct) = 1 and
limCt!1 U0(Ct) = 0.
There are two investment technologies available in this economy. There
is a short-term technology which transforms one unit of the good invested at
period t into one unit at period t + 1 and is referred to as the storage tech-
nology. There is also a long-term investment technology which transforms
one unit of the good invested at period t to R > 1 units at period t + 2. If
it is interrupted at t + 1, it yields a positive return of r · 1.
The banking system consists of a large number of identical banks which
are perfectly competing on the terms of their deposit contract and are subject
to withdrawal shocks. Because banks and depositors are identical, all banks
will choose the same contract. In addition, following Ennis and Keister (2003)
[14], all depositors hold the same beliefs which are in°uenced by the same
extrinsic factors that trigger the runs, and therefore either all banks will
experience a run or none will. Hence, without loss of generality, we consider
a representative intergenerational bank in this economy that has access to all
7the available technologies and maximises the expected welfare of depositors.
At any time period t, the bank accepts newborn agents' endowment and
o®ers in return a deposit contract that speci¯es a payment depending on the
realisation of their consumption preferences at t+1; after they have received
a preference shock at the beginning of the middle period of their life. The
deposit contract has the form of (D1; D2), where D1 is the payment designed
for depositors who turn out to be impatient and D2 the payment for those
who turn out to be patient. The bank is subject to a sequential service
constraint1 so that depositors are served on a ¯rst-come, ¯rst-served order.
Depositors are assumed to be myopic in the sense that they can not observe
how many depositors are in front or behind them in the line, and following a
sequential service constraint, the bank can not distinguish the individual type
of each depositor once they approach the counter to receive their payment.
Bank runs are exogenous and are modelled as unanticipated withdrawals
where all depositors exercise their right to withdraw their funds at any time
period, irrespectively of their consumption preference. A bank run occurs
when due to a totally extraneous factor, unrelated to any fundamentals, each
depositor believes that other depositors will rush do withdraw their funds.
In addition, in order to analyse the dynamics in an environment where we
allow the possibility of runs, we impose that the bank survives the ¯rst run.
In contrast with the vast majority of the literature which associates runs
directly with banks' failure, we take a more general approach concerning
banks' ¯nancial stability. In a dynamic framework, we consider that a bank
that experiences an excess demand for withdrawals can ¯nd itself in one of
the following three conditions2:
(i) Firstly, a bank is considered to be \bankrupt" when it fails to meet its
promised payments even after utilising all its available assets.
(ii) Secondly, a bank is said to \go out of business" when it serves all the
1The notion of a sequential service constraint has been introduced by Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)[11] and analysed by Wallace (1988)[22].
2Allen and Gale (2000)[3] have used a similar characterisation of the banks' ¯nancial
stability in order to explain the ¯nancial contagion in the banking system through an
interbank market.
8excess withdrawals but, by doing so, is left with less resources than the
total endowment of a newborn generation.
(iii) Thirdly, a bank is said to \survive" the run when it serves the excess
withdrawals and is left with more resources than the total endowment
of the new generation.
In the ¯rst two scenarios, the newborn agents will prefer to form a new
bank since they can attain superior allocations and a higher level of social
welfare. In the last scenario, the surviving bank is \staying in business" since
newborn agents can achieve a higher level of expected utility by depositing
their endowments to the surviving bank than forming a new bank. Of course,
in equilibrium, where the returns of the assets match the bank's standard
liabilities, the bank is considered to be solvent.
In an in¯nitely repeated version of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)[11]
model with bank runs, let m 2 Z+ (where Z+ is the set of nonnegative
integers), represent the number of runs that have already taken place in this
economy, where the time interval between any two successive runs represents
a cycle. Within a cycle, time is indexed by t 2 f0;:::;tmg, where tm ¸ 3.
Time is reset to zero when a run takes place and cycles are allowed to have
di®erent duration; where tm can be di®erent for every m. Our analysis shows
that within each cycle, similarly to the discussion in Qi (1994)[19] about
the stability of the intergenerational bank, if an intermediary survives the
¯rst run, the bank has to rely periodically on the new deposits made by the
newborn agents of the current generation in order for the steady-state to be
reached. However, in contrast to Qi (1994)[19], we assume that the myopic
newborn agents can not anticipate a run. Therefore, we consider the fol-
lowing sequence of events in each time period; ¯rstly, newborn agents of the
current generation deposit their endowment to the bank3 and all the with-
drawal decisions are made by agents of the past generations who have realised
3Participation in the deposit contract is guaranteed since, similarly to the intragen-
erational bank, it o®ers liquidity insurance to depositors and therefore dominates the
competitive outcome as it is shown in Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998)[15], among others.
9their type (standard withdrawals or excess withdrawals due to a run), and
then the bank makes its investment portfolio decisions with the resources
available. In this respect, let It;m be the the proportion of the good that
the bank invests in the long-term technology and St;m the proportion that
it invests in the storage technology, for a given period t during cycle m.
Because r < 1 < R holds, an intermediary will never choose to ¯nance
excess withdrawals by liquidating its investment in the productive technol-
ogy when liquid assets are available. Hence, for any given m, denote xm the
amount of resources that remain available for investment at the initial period
t = 0, and ym the resources that are invested in the long-term technology
during the previous cycle and comes to maturity at t = 1 after the run m has
been occurred. We require fxm;ymg ¸ 0 and as it arises from our analysis
the values of xm and ym depend on the timing of runs within the crisis.
Within each cycle, we follow an analysis similar to Qi (1994) [19] to derive
the steady-state equilibrium deposit contract payo® which we will refer to
as \short-term" steady-sate equilibrium payo®. We assume that all relevant
agents to the representative bank's planning problem are treated equally,
regardless of their generation. Given that runs are unanticipated, it follows
that all current and future depositors are o®ered a deposit contract that spec-
i¯es a \short-term" steady-state payo® (D1;m;D2;m) which maximises their
expected utility and is, therefore, ex-ante identical for a given m. We show
that within any cycle, a feasible and stationary transition path of investment
in both available technologies to a \short-term" steady-sate exists, along
which the expected utility of all the members of all generations is constant.
However, in order to generalise the bank's planning problem for any cycle
during the crisis, we need to address two important issues. The ¯rst concerns
the treatment of the newborn agents at the time period when a run takes
place, given the assumed sequence of events within each time period t and
the assumption of equal treatment of all relevant agents. More speci¯cally,
for any given time period t within the cycle m, the deposit contract that the
bank o®ers to newborn agents in exchange for their endowment is identical
10to the one o®ered to the newborn agents of the previous generation since
the bank can not anticipate a sunspot run. If a run occurs at the same
time period, then the current period of cycle m (t = tm) is also the ¯rst
period (t = 0) of the next cycle m+1 for the surviving bank. In other words,
successive cycles overlap in the time period when a run takes place. Provided
that runs are unanticipated, we treat these newborn agents as agents of the
previous cycle so that the bank does not renege on the initial agreement and
honour its promised payo®s4.
The second point refers to the relationship between the payments of the
two di®erent types of depositors within a cycle. We assume that the coef-
¯cient of depositors' relative risk aversion is su±ciently high such that the
incentive compatibility constraint that arises in our analysis in order to pre-
vent depositors' misrepresentation of their type, binds for a newly formed
bank. This is in accordance with Bencivenga and Smith (1991)[5] who pro-
vide a necessary condition that ¯nancial intermediation can be justi¯ed for
a high level of depositors' risk aversion, and with von Thadden (2002)[21]
where a non-arbitrage incentive compatibility constraint is more likely to
bind at all times. In our model, this assumption provides a necessary con-
dition which ensures that the relationship between the payments, o®ered to
both types of depositors within the same cycle, is the same for any surviving
bank during the crisis. It also determines whether the resulting di®erence
equation of successive \short-term" equilibrium payo®s takes a linear or non-
linear form.
3 Bank's Planning Problem
We commence the analysis of ¯nancial intermediation by considering a repre-
sentative bank's planning problem at time t = 0 for a given cycle m. At any
particular point of time, the bank in question accepts deposits and makes
4The case where agents born in the time period when a run takes place are treated as
agents of the next cycle, so that the bank renege on the initial contract, has been analysed
in my PhD thesis where i have shown that similar results can be obtained.
11investment in the available technologies. As any other bank within the com-
petitive market, it is modelled as an in¯nitely lived ¯nancial intermediary
since bank runs are assumed to be \sunspot" phenomena that are unantic-
ipated by the bank. Provided that all the agents participate in the bank's
deposit contract and deposit their endowment, the relevant agents to this
planning problem are agents who are born at and after time t = 0. Since the
bank does not renege on the initial contract, following the assumed sequence
of events within each period, the agents who deposit their funds at t = 0
and have been o®ered a contract similar to that o®ered to the agents born
in the previous cycle, they receive the full proceeds of their contract, as they
are speci¯ed by the contract's terms. For the bank to be able to honour the
promised payo®s to depositors, the following sequential budget constraints
must be satis¯ed which specify that in each period bank's liabilities (LHS)
should be equal to its assets (RHS) due to the assumed intense competition
in the banking system.
0 = xm ¡ (S0;m + I0;m) for t = 0
¼D1;0;m¡1 = 1 + ymR + S0;m ¡ (S1;m + I1;m) for t = 1
¼D1;1;m + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;0;m¡1 = 1 + RI0;m + S1;m ¡ (S2;m + I2;m) for t = 2
¼D1;t¡1;m + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;t¡2;m = 1 + RIt¡2;m + St¡1;m ¡ (St;m + It;m) for t ¸ 3
(3.1)
For any cycle m, let fSt;mg and fIt;mg denote sequences fS0;m;S1;m;S2;m;:::g
and fI0;m;I1;m;I2;m;:::g, respectively. In the same way, let D1;t;m and D2;t;m
denote the payments o®ered to newborn agents who deposit their endow-
ments at period t, if they withdraw their deposits at t + 1 or t + 2, respec-
tively. The highly competitive environment in the banking system compels
the representative bank to choose its investment portfolio such as to maximise
the expected utility of the newborn agents within each time period in order
to attract new deposits, subject to the above sequential budget constraints,
which therefore should hold with equality. Bank's liabilities incorporate the
12payments to depositors who are eligible to withdraw (i.e. without regard to
runs) and become stationary at t ¸ 3 after all the impatient and patient de-
positors born at t = 0 have been served at t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. On
the other hand, for any time period within a cycle, the bank's assets consist
of the deposits made by the current newborn generation, and the returns of
the investment made in the productive and storage technology (two-periods
and one-period ago, respectively) and comes to maturity at the current pe-
riod. After all legitimate liabilities have been met, the rest of the available
resources are allocated in the two available investment technologies. In order
to generalise our analysis, we have denoted as xm the resources available for
investment at t = 0 which are allowed to be di®erent from new deposits, and
ym the resources that are invested in the long-term technology during the
previous cycle, where fxm; ymg ¸ 0.
From the above formation of the bank's planning problem we can observe
that one solution would be for the bank to o®er a high payo® to newborn
agents at t = 1 and without regard to future generations, subject to the above
sequential budget constraints and the incentive compatibility constraint that
arises in our model, in order to drive its competitors out of the market and
enjoy monopoly pro¯ts in future periods. However, due to major concep-
tual and technical di±culties in forming the set of all possible strategies, we
assume that all relevant agents, regardless of their generation, are treated
equally. Hence, our analysis is limited to steady-state payo®s that o®er all
current and future depositors an identical ex ante payo® under incentive com-
patibility. Thus, let (D1;m; D2;m) denote the ex ante steady-state payo®. Of
course, the problem of determining the optimal payo®s is the same in any
time period and therefore we consider that the bank solves the expected util-
ity maximisation problem at t = 0. In addition, the resulting allocation in
this economy is di®erent from that of the social planner. The social planner
does not face any competitive pressures and its only objective is to max-
imise the expected utility of the depositors across the whole time horizon of
a cycle according to some aggregate welfare function (as in Allan and Gale
(1997)[1]).
13Since the deposit contract terms are time independent, the sequential
budget constraints can be written as:
0 = xm ¡ (S0;m + I0;m) for t = 0
¼D1;m¡1 = 1 + ymR + S0;m ¡ (S1;m + I1;m) for t = 1
¼D1;m + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m¡1 = 1 + RI0;m + S1;m ¡ (S2;m + I2;m) for t = 2
¼D1;m + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m = 1 + RIt¡2;m + St¡1;m ¡ (St;m + It;m) for t ¸ 3
(3.2)
Provided that all relevant agents receive the same payo® independently
of their generation, a budget-feasible steady-state payo® (D1;m;D2;m) is de-
¯ned.
De¯nition 3.1 A steady-state payo® (D1;m;D2;m) is budget feasible if there
exist some nonnegative fIt;mg and fSt;mg such that the conditions described
by 3.2 hold.
To simplify the notation, denote am = ¼D1;m + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m the bank's
standard liabilities for each time period t ¸ 3. Given the above de¯nition of
the steady state, we derive the steady-state feasibility conditions and the con-
ditions on fIt;m; St;mg which satisfy the feasibility condition and determine
the transition path of the investment technologies towards this steady-state
allocation.
Proposition 3.2 A necessary condition for a steady-state payo® (D1;m;D2;m)
to be budget feasible is that D1;m and D2;m satisfy
Bm(D1;m; D1;m¡1; R) :
2(1 ¡ am)
R ¡ 1
+ 2 ¡ ¼D1;m + R(xm + ym) ¡ am¡1 = 0
(3.3)
In particular, the sequential budget constraints are satis¯ed by the follow-
ing nonnegative fIt;m; St;mg when ymR ¡ ¼D1;m¡1 > 0 :5





0 for t = 0 and t = 2¸;¸ 2 Z++
ymR ¡ ¼D1;m¡1 for t = 1





xm for t = 0
2(am¡1)
R¡1 ¡ 1 for t = 2¸;¸ 2 Z++
1 for t = 2¸ + 1;¸ 2 Z+
where Z+ and Z++ denote the set of nonnegative and positive integers,
respectively.
(Proof: see appendix)
Despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty about the with-
drawal demand in our model, so that the bank's deposit contract can o®er
the optimal payo®s to both types of depositors, when depositors are served
sequentially on a ¯rst-come ¯rst-served order, the bank cannot distinguish
their individual type. Due to this informational disadvantage of the bank,
patient depositors in the middle period of their life, instead of waiting to
withdraw D2;m that is designed for their type may ¯nd optimal to misrepre-
sent themselves initially as impatient by withdrawing D1;m, and then emulate
the newborn agents of the current generation by redepositing their funds. In
this way, they will receive a payment of D2
1;m at the last period of their life
in which they derive utility from consumption. An incentive compatibility
constraint should be introduced to ensure that the utility from consumption
they derive in the ¯nal period of their life by misrepresenting themselves as
impatient and redepositing their funds is at least less than the utility from
consumption that they could derive by waiting to withdraw and consume
the payment designed for their type6. Simplifying for the utility function,
satisfy the sequential budget constraints with equality violate the nonnegativity condition
and, therefore, is ignored.
6According to Fulghieri and Rovelli (1998)[15] this informational asymmetry is re-
moved if the bank could introduce age-dependant restrictions on the deposit contract.
Under these circumstances, from the bank's maximisation problem it follows that the
15the incentive compatibility constraint can be expressed in terms of payments.
The problem that the representative intergenerational bank has to solve
within any cycle in order to determine the optimal deposit contract's payo®s
is;
Problem 3.3 The intergenerational bank maximises depositors' expected util-
ity
max
D1; m D2; m
f¼ U (D1;m) + (1 ¡ ¼)U (D2;m)g (3.4)
subject to:
the feasibility constraint as described in Proposition 3.2
Bm(D1;m; D1;m¡1; R) :
2(1 ¡ am)
R ¡ 1
+ 2 ¡ ¼D1;m + R(xm + ym) ¡ am¡1 = 0




where, the bank's investment decisions between the two alternative in-
vestment technologies are chosen according to Proposition 3.2. To simplify
notation, denote wm(D1;m¡1; R) = R(xm + ym) ¡ am¡1 and vm(D1;m; R) =
Bm¡wm, where wm captures the net resources available for investment after
all the bank's commitments with respect to the previous cycle have been
met so that it depends on the previous cycle's equilibrium payo®, and vm
represents the assets and liabilities of the current cycle so that the budget
constraint holds with equality.
In our analysis about the transition towards the \long-term" steady-state
equilibrium, we must ensure that the steady-state allocation the surviving
bank can attain in any cycle is superior to the steady-state allocation that
\Golden Rule" levels of investment and consumption smoothing could be achieved. How-
ever, the anonymity of the deposit contract implies that this information asymmetry always
exists.
16newborn agents of the next generation can obtain if they form a new bank.
This requirement imposes a lower boundary on the resources available for
investment after a run has taken place. In other words, the intermediary will
\stay in business" if after any given run, it has been left with more resources
than the aggregate endowment of the next generation of agents.
Hence, when newborn agents of a particular generation decide to form a
new bank (we use the subscript N) at any period, then the current available
resources of the newly formed intermediary are equal to the endowments
of the newborn agents, and no prior investment comes to maturity in the
following period.
xN = 1
yN = 0 (3.6)
However, in this setting there is no previous cycle, and therefore, no out-
standing liabilities that depend on the previous cycle's equilibrium payo®.
As a consequence, the sequential budget constraints of the bank's planning
problem can not be described by (3.2)7. In order to check whether a potential
\long-term" steady-state equilibrium payo® is su±ciently high so that new
generations do not have incentives to form a new bank, we need to derive a
condition such as the budget constraint 3.3 becomes identical to the budget
constraint of a newly formed bank. This is when R(xN + yN) ¡ aN¡1 = 0,
or alternatively, wN = 0. Consequently, when a run takes place, the inter-
generational bank survives the run when wm ¸ 0.
In order to simplify the transitional dynamics towards a \long-term"
steady-state equilibrium payo® when we allow for successive runs to occur,
we have assumed that the incentive compatibility constraint binds for a newly
formed bank, which is a necessary assumption to ensure that the constraint
also binds for any surviving bank, and is also consistent with our model. This
7The sequential budget constraints, as well as the general budget constraint, are dis-
cussed in Proposition 5 by Qi (1994)[19], p. 401.
17is more likely to be the case when the agents' degree of relative risk aversion
is su±ciently high 8. The necessity of this assumption derives from the bank's
maximisation problem where we can observe that if the constraint binds for
a newly formed bank, which has the lowest available resources for investment
and therefore o®ers the lower equilibrium payo®, it also binds for any other
allocation that a surviving bank can o®er. In terms of consistency, we start
with a bank that prior to any run could achieve the \Golden Rule" level of
consumption smoothing but due to the asymmetry of information the about
depositors' age, the incentive compatibility constraint binds. Therefore, is
consistent in our analysis to consider that the relationship between the pay-
ments of both types of depositors for any cycle is described by this constraint
so that it binds at all times. Hence, welfare comparison between \short-term"
steady-states can be simpli¯ed to a simple comparison of a payment designed
for either type of depositor or to a comparison of the net resources that re-
main available for investment (provided that fIt;m; St;mg are nonnegative),
which in turn determines the relationship between bank's liabilities across
di®erent \short-term" steady-states. Hence, when wm = wN the incentive
compatibility constraint 3.5 binds. It also indicates that payments designed
for the two types of depositors are related in a nonlinear manner, so that the
relationship between successive equilibria is also nonlinear. This gives rise to
a nonlinear system of ¯rst-order di®erence equations.
Commencing the analysis on the e®ects of a sequence of bank runs to
the bank's ¯nancial stability, suppose that, initially (m = 0) an in¯nitely-
lived bank is in place. Following the standard approach in the literature
in determining the planning problem of an in¯nitely lived intermediary at
t = 0, the relevant agents, apart from the agents who are born at and after
8More speci¯cally, assuming a utility of consumption function of the form U(C) =
C
1¡°
1¡° , where ° the coe±cient of relative risk aversion, the ¯rst order condition of the




° D1;m. In order for the incentive com-





should hold. Substituting for D1;N, which can be obtained by substituting wm = 0 into





lnD1; N in order for the incentive compatibility constraint to bind.
18t = 0, are also the impatient depositors of the previous generation (t = ¡1)
who have deposited all their endowment. Analysing the sequential budget
constraints as they described by (3.2), we observe that, at period t = 0,
the resources available for investment are equal to the endowment of the
newborn agents, deposited in the current period. In addition, at period
t = 1, the investment made in the long-term technology at period t = ¡1,
(i.e. I¡1;0 = 1), comes to maturity and the bank has also to serve the
impatient agents of generation t = ¡1 who are in the last period of their
life and withdraw on aggregate (1 ¡ ¼)D2;0. For computational ease and in
order to keep our analysis consistent, we incorporate this extra liability into
y0 which is discounted by R. Hence, for m = 0;
x0 = 1




Note also that the previous cycle is identical to the current cycle, and
therefore am¡1 = am. Substituting fx0; y0g into the feasibility constraint
3.3, the latter it becomes:
a0 = R (3.8)
where a0 = ¼D1;0 + (1 ¡ ¼)D2;0.
Hence, the steady-state payo® (D1;0; D2;0) is such as the bank's standard
liabilities are equal to the returns of the long-term investment. Solving the
bank's maximisation problem we can derive that the incentive compatibility
constraint binds, so that 1 < D1;0 < R < D2
1;0. Obviously, new generations
of agents do not have incentive to form a new bank since w0 > 0, and therefore
can achieve a higher level of expected utility (i.e. D1;N < D1;0). Further-
more, by substituting fx0; y0g and equation 3.8, where a0 = am¡1 = am,
into the conditions for fIt;mg and fSt;mg in Proposition 3.2, we observe that
fIt;0g = 1 and fSt;0g = 0 so that for any given period during m = 0, the
19bank invests all the available resources on the productive technology.
In examining how bank's ¯nancial stability evolves during the crisis we
¯rst need to determine the initial allocation of the discrete dynamical system
that we will derive. Of course, this allocation should be feasible and therefore
we require that that the bank survives the ¯rst run, or w1 > 0. In particular,
provided that bank runs are unanticipated shocks, let the ¯rst run occur
at any time period t where any excess withdrawals are ¯nanced out of new
deposits of the current generation.9 This implies that the available resources
for investment at t = 0 are what is left out of new deposits after all the
impatient depositors of the previous generation who withdraw early have
been served. The investment made in the previous period in the long-term
technology remains una®ected, where It;0 = 1. Therefore, for m = 1;
x1 = 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D1;0
y1 = 1 (3.9)
where we require that w1 > 0 for the bank to survive at least the ¯rst
run. The \short-term" steady-state is such as D1;1 < D1;0 < R10 so that
a1 < a0 = R. Checking its feasibility we derive that the conditions on
fIt;0; St;0g, as they described in Proposition 3.2, are satis¯ed and therefore
the steady-state equilibrium can be sustained.11
9If the excess withdrawals just exhaust the new deposits from the newborn agents,
then x1 = 0 and y1 = 1 so that w1 = 0. Similarly, in the alternative case where the
bank liquidates the long-term investment made in the previous period in order to meet
any excess withdrawals which just exhaust the resources obtained, then x1 = 1 and y1 = 0
so that again w1 = 0 and the bank \goes out of business". However, since r < 1 resources
are wasted and therefore liquidation is never an option.
10It is su±cient to show that the di®erence between w0 and w1 is negative. From our
analysis, w0 ¡ w1 = ¼D1;0 ¡ (R(x1 + y1) ¡ a0) and from a0 = R the di®erence can be
simpli¯ed to (1 ¡ ¼)D1;0 (R ¡ D1;0) > 0 since D1;0 < R.
11For the investment in productive and storage technology, we observe that I2¸;1 > 0,
S1;1 = R¡¼D1;0 > 0 and S2¸+1;1 = R¡a1 > 0 since a1 < a0 = R, respectively. If instead
the excess withdrawals where ¯nanced by liquidating the long-term investment made in
the previous period, then the resources available for investment at the ¯rst two periods of
the ¯rst cycle would be x1 = 1 and y1 = 1 ¡
(1¡¼)D1; 0
r where r 2 (0;(1 ¡ ¼)D1;0] for the
20After the ¯rst run has taken place, Proposition 3.2 indicates an impor-
tant property of the transition path of the investment in the two available
technologies towards feasible steady state equilibria.
Property 3.4 For any m ¸ 1, the bank's investment in fIt;m; St;mg, and
therefore its liquidity position, becomes periodic with a two-period periodicity
in order for a steady-state equilibrium to be sustained. During even periods
the bank holds an illiquid portfolio of assets, and during odd periods it holds
a liquid portfolio of assets.
This property of the \short-term" equilibria arises in our model from the
equal treatment assumption and the nature of the investment technologies.
When the ¯rst run occurs, the smooth pattern of the investment in the two
technologies (It;0 = 1 and St;0 = 0) is disrupted. The patient agents who
trigger the run receive the payment that is designed for impatient depositors
instead of the higher payment that is designed for their type (D1;0 < D2;0).
Hence, the surviving bank ¯nances relatively inexpensive its rather expensive
liabilities out of the new deposits so that the total resources for investment
at t = 0 are less than the endowment of a new generation, but greater at
t = 1 since the investment in the productive technology that was planned to
meet its standard liabilities comes to maturity. Provided that the bank does
not renege on the initial contract, the sequential budget constraints become
stationary for t ¸ 3; after all depositors born at t = 0 have been served.
This process is repeated for any other cycle. From the equal treatment as-
sumption, the two-period periodicity of the bank's portfolio is perpetuated
for the whole duration of each cycle as the bank o®ers the same allocation
to all agents within the current cycle.
As a result, the liquidity of the bank's investment portfolio becomes pe-
riodic with a two-period periodicity so that periods of high liquidity are
followed by periods of low liquidity. From Proposition 3.2 we observe that
bank to survive the ¯rst run. Note, however, that w0 ¡ w1 = ¼D1;0 ¡ Ry1 = ¡S1;1 and
therefore the \short-term" equilibrium is not feasible.
21bank's total resources during even periods (t = 2¸) in any cycle, net of new
deposits, are equal to the return of the long-term term and short-term in-






+ R ¡ am. Subtracting the standard liabilities am we ob-
tain that the total available resources for investment, net of new deposits,
during even periods are
2(am¡R)
R1 < 0, since am < R is required in order for
S2¸+1;m > 0 and the allocation to be feasible. Hence, at even periods the
bank relies on new deposits in order to meet its standard liabilities, and
therefore we argue that during even periods it holds an illiquid portfolio of
assets. In a similar manner, the resources net of new deposits during odd
periods (t = 2¸ + 1) in any cycle are RI2¸¡1;m + S2¸;m = R, and its total
resources R ¡ am > 0 for a feasible allocation. Hence, the returns from past
investment are greater than its standard liabilities and therefore we argue
that during odd periods it holds a very liquid portfolio of assets. Overall,
the assumptions of our model impose a transition path of bank's investment
portfolio towards these equilibria. The liquidity of bank's portfolio, there-
fore, depends only on the model's parameter values and on the timing of runs;
during periods of low or high liquidity. The periodicity of the investment of
the two available technologies implies that the liquidity of bank's portfolio
becomes also periodic, which in turn determines the bank's ability to meet
any excess withdrawals in case of a run for any m ¸ 1.
From the above property, xm and ym can be determined and the system
of di®erence equations can be derived. In this way, consider the period tm¡1
which is the last period of cycle m ¡ 1 during which the m run takes place
and therefore constitutes the initial period of the m cycle.
If tm¡1 is a period of low liquidity (even period), the total resources avail-
able for investment, incorporating new deposits, are
2(am¡1¡1)
R¡1 ¡1. Therefore,
xm is equal to the total resources minus the excess withdrawals, and ym is
equal to the investment in the productive technology made in the odd period




¡ 1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D1;m¡1
ym = 1 (3.10)
On the other hand, if tm¡1 is a period of high liquidity (odd period),
the total resources available for investment, incorporating new deposits are
1 + R ¡ am¡1. Therefore, xm and ym are:





Hence, depending on tm¡1, by substituting xm and ym into the budget
constraint, incorporating the incentive compatibility constraint, we obtain a
function Bm(D1;m; D1;m; R) = 0 which is an implicit function of the di®er-
ence equation between the two successive \short-term" equilibrium payo®s.
Let the \long-term" steady-state be (D1;M; D2;M). Setting D1;m = D1;m¡1,
we obtain a function Bm(D1;m; R), the solution of which (¯xed points) may
constitute potential \long-term" equilibria if they satisfy our conditions on
fSt;M; It;Mg (i.e. BM(D1;M; R) = 0). The \long-term" steady state is bud-
get feasible and therefore can be sustained only when wM > 0, S1;M > 0,
and D1;M · D1;0 in order for S2¸+1;M to be positive.12
As the reader can notice, the evolution of bank's liquidity position dur-
ing the whole crisis is described by a set of di®erence equations. However,
provided the randomness of a bank run event within each cycle when we
consider the whole crisis, the system becomes unpredictable since through
the process of iteration, ¯xed points and orbits will depend on the timing
of these events. Hence, the system becomes very unstable and may exhibit
chaotic behaviour.
12From equation 3.8 we can observe that for any D1;M · D1;0 it follows aM · a0, and
therefore S2¸+1;M > 0.
234 Bank's Financial Stability with Reserve Re-
quirement and Borrowing
The erratic behaviour that arises in our model results from the periodicity
of the liquidity of bank's portfolio, which in turn depends only on the tim-
ing of runs and the model's parameter values, since the investment in the
two available technologies is determined by Proposition 3.2. However, the
introduction of the possibility of external borrowing can resolve the unpre-
dictability of banks' liquidity provision. In this respect, we consider that a
Central Bank responsible for the conduct of monetary policy and the sound-
ness of the banking system is in place. On its role as a Lender of Last Resort
can improve the ¯nancial stability of the banking system through injections
of capital to illiquid intermediaries by providing access to a discount window.
In addition, as a part of its responsibility in the formulation and implemen-
tation of monetary policy, a minimum reserve requirement is introduced as
a way to control banks' liquidity.
These policy measures can smooth the liquidity of banks' portfolio over
periods of ¯nancial distress and ensure the soundness of the banking system
over the whole period of crisis. Following the standard literature, we view a
Central Bank as being largely motivated by the negative consequences that
bank failures, originating in liquidity problems, have on the stability of the
¯nancial system. Banks are identical and, according to property 3.4 are mod-
elled as illiquid but solvent institutions since we require that they survive the
¯rst withdrawal shock. In addition, the Central Bank has full information
about their liquidity position, and therefore, moral hazard problems involved
in direct lending do not arise in our model.
In this setting, suppose that a Central Bank is in place which has ac-
cess to unlimited resources and lends funds through a discount window to
illiquid but solvent banks. Let ¿ 2 [0;1] be the one-period interest rate for
one unit of resources borrowed, and ·m ¸ 0 the amount of resources that
the central bank lends during a period of low liquidity. Therefore, a bank
with an illiquid portfolio of assets that borrows an amount of resources ·m at
24t = 0 has to repay an amount ·m(1+¿) at period t = 1, during which it has
high liquidity. In this way, the Central Bank can impose ¿ and ·m through
a minimum reserve requirement, to smooth the liquidity of banks' portfolio
over the periods characterised by an abnormal increase in withdrawals.
We follow a simple formulation of the problem where ¿ and ·m are choosen
such as banks' liquidity is perfectly smoothed during the event of a run. In
this way, the timing of runs becomes irrelevant in our model since the evolu-
tion of liquidity over di®erent cycles can be described by a single di®erence
equation which we can analyse and examine whether or not is possible for a
representative bank to survive a crisis.
Let the amount ·m borrowed by an illiquid bank that experiences a with-
drawal shock be su±ciently high such that its available resources for invest-
ment at the current period are equal to the resources that it holds during
the periods of high liquidity, or alternatively x2m¡1 = ·m + x2m¡2, for every
m ¸ 2. This amount is repaid after one period where the bank has su±cient
liquidity after the investment in the long-term technology comes to maturity.
The interest rate charged by the central bank is set such as to ensure that ym
remain the same independently of the time periods of runs, or alternatively
y2m¡1 = y2m¡2 ¡
·m(1+¿)
R , for every m ¸ 2. Clearly, the cost of borrowing an
amount · for one period at an interest rate ¿, has to be discounted over two
periods by R in order to be subtracted from the investment in the long-term









What we consider here is a variation of the minimum reserve requirement
regulatory policy which we will refer to as \adjustable" reserve requirement
as it provides more °exibility to banks' investment portfolio. Such policy is
25implemented by imposing that at the time period where resources are below
the level that a solvent bank has during periods of low liquidity, they should
increase to the level at which they are at periods of high liquidity. When the
run m is triggered and resources fall below
2(am¡1¡1)
R¡1 ¡ 1, the bank has to
borrow from the central bank a su±cient amount of resources km to restore
its liquidity position bank to its high level during the odd periods. Provided
that the unit cost of borrowing for one period is determined by 4.1, the timing
of runs during the crisis becomes irrelevant as xm and ym are always given
by equation 3.11. This \adjustable" policy of reserve holdings, apart form
eliminating the unpredictability of banks' liquidity position during runs, it
also encourages an optimal allocation of resources, in contrast with a °at
minimum reserve requirement which reduce investment in the productive
technology and therefore social welfare. This is simply because the thresh-
old level of reserves at which the policy is enforced is lower than the actual
level of liquid reserves that the bank is required to hold when the policy is
implemented, and reserves are adjusted only when runs are triggered. This
facilitates higher investment in the productive technology, and therefore, an
optimal allocation of resources for the whole duration of a cycle, in contrast
with a constant minimum required level of reserves for the whole duration of
the cycle.
Consequently, irrespectively of the time period of runs, the bank's re-
sources available for investment and distribution at the ¯rst two periods of
each cycle are given by equation 3.11 for any m ¸ 2. By substituting wm
into the budget constraint and setting D1;m = D1;m¡1, the later becomes
Bm(D1;m; R) = R2 ¡(1¡¼)(R¡1)D2
1;m ¡RD1;m the roots of which deter-
mine the potential \long-term" equilibria. The discriminant of the quadratic
function is always positive, and therefore, bifurcations do not occur for our




1 + 4(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1) ¡ 1
´
2(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
(4.2)
from which we accept the positive root by the nonnegativity condition on
26equilibrium payments. This payo® can constitute a potential \long-term"
equilibrium only if it is feasible.
Lemma 4.1 The positive root satis¯es the conditions on fIt;M; St;Mg and is
monotonically increasing in R. It constitutes a potential \long-term" steady-
state equilibrium when the return of the long-term investment is su±ciently
high such as wM > 0.
(Proof: see appendix)
The above lemma guarantees that the \long-term" steady state equilib-
rium payo® we have derived is feasible. However, whether or not the system
converges towards this payo® depends on its nature which is characterised by
the derivative of any particular \short-term" equilibrium payo® with respect
to the previous equilibrium payo®, when is evaluated at this ¯xed point. By
substituting xm and ym as described by equation 3.11 into the budget con-
















The value and sign of the above derivative characterises the transition of
successive equilibrium payo®s. If the absolute value of the derivative is less
than unity, then the \long-term" equilibrium is referred to as \attractive" and
the successive equilibrium payments will converge towards that equilibrium.
Otherwise, the \long-term" equilibrium is referred to as \repelling" since
successive equilibrium payo®s diverge from that payo®, and consequently
it can not be achieved. Moreover, the time path towards or away from
the \long-term" equilibrium steady-state is determined by the sign of this
derivative; if positive, the system converges (or diverges) monotonically, and
if negative, the system oscillates towards to (or away from) the equilibrium.
However, an important property of 4.3 enables us to characterise the
\long-term" steady-state equilibrium.
27Property 4.2 The derivative described in 4.3 is always less than unity and
monotonically decreasing in R.
(Proof: see appendix).
The above property suggests that, for a given ¼, cycles (orbits) nearby the
\long-term" steady-state will converge towards the equilibrium for low values








in terms of R enables us to de¯ne two thresh-
old values of R which determine the nature of the \long-term" steady-state







= 0 and R the







= ¡1, for a given ¼, as it is indicated by
equation 4.3. In the analysis that follows, the the transition towards \long-
term" steady states in each case is graphically displayed through graphical
iteration using web diagrams.








1 so that Bm has a positive slope. The ¯xed point is an attracting equilib-
rium, and the system of the di®erence equation which describes successive
cycles' equilibrium payo®s converge monotonically to this \long-term" equi-
librium. This case is illustrated in ¯gure 1 where on the horizontal and
vertical axis we measure the successive equilibrium payo®s. The area where
a \long-term" equilibrium is feasible is delimitated by the area between D1;N
and D1;0. The payo® D1;N is the lower boundary value for D1;M because for
any equilibrium payment below the payment that newborn agents can reach
by forming a new bank it would imply that wm < 0, so one of our conditions
would be violated, in a given cycle m. Also, D1;0 is the upper boundary value
for D1;M because for any equilibrium payments above D1;0 the nonnegativ-
ity condition on S2¸+1;m would be violated. The \long-term" steady-state
payo® is determined by the intersection of Bm(D1m; D1;m¡1; R) = 0 func-
tion, which is the graphical illustration of the general budget constraint and
represents the relationship between payo®s of successive cycles, and the 45
degrees line through the origin. Successive equilibrium payments converge
28monotonically towards the long-term equilibrium.
Despite the fact that the bank holds a very liquid portfolio of assets,
for very low values of R, the \long-term" equilibrium may violate the lower
boundary so that wM < 0. This case is represented by the Bm;1 = 0 line
and the ¯xed point M1 which does not constitute a long-term equilibrium
since, after a particular run has taken place, newborn agents will prefer to
form a new bank. For example, for ¼ = 0:4 and R = 1:2, D1;M = 1:0827 <







= 0:916. However, for
higher values of R such that wM > 0, the ¯xed point such as M2 constitutes
a \long-term equilibrium" and is determined by the intersection of Bm;2 = 0
and the 45 degrees line.
In terms of ¯gure 1, we analyse the path of successive cycle's equilibrium
payo®s by the process of graphical iteration, where the arrows on the graph
indicate the direction of iteration. From an initial value, we use Bm;2 = 0
line to map successive payo®s on the vertical axis, and the 45 degrees line to
transplot them to the horizontal axis. Starting from D1;1 on the 45 degrees
line which is the ¯rst point of the orbit, we move down towards the Bm;2 = 0
line which maps D1;1 into D1;2 and we read its height on the vertical axis as
the value of D1;2. Next, in order to map D1;2 into D1;3, ¯rstly we transplot
D1;2 on the horizontal axis (the second point of the orbit), and then down
towards the Bm;2 = 0 line that maps D1;2 into D1;3 as we can read on the
vertical axis. By repeating this process we can trace out all the subsequent
values of D1;m until we reach the \long-term" steady state equilibrium at
point M2. Hence, for low values of R, but su±ciently high to ensure that
the surviving bank \stays in business" in the long-term for a given ¼ (i.e.
wM > 0), the system converge monotonically to the \long-term" equilibrium
such as point M2 in ¯gure 1. For example, for ¼ = 0:75 and R = 2, D1;N =








The monotonic transition towards the \long-term" steady state is ex-
plained by the positive relationship between successive \short-term" equi-
librium payo®s, and the e®ect of R on D1;0 which, in turn, a®ects the ¯rst
allocation of the system D1;1. Indeed, from 3.8 we can observe that D1;0 is
29increasing in R and therefore, for very low values of R, the cost of ¯nanc-
ing excess withdrawals out of new deposits is low. The remaining resources
available for distribution and investment during the ¯rst cycle are su±ciently
high such as D1;1 is relatively high in comparison to the initial allocation.
Of course, this e®ect is perpetuated between successive equilibrium payo®s
through the iteration process, and diminishes over time as is indicated by the
slope of Bm which is less than unity, until we reach the \long-term" steady-
state.








< ¡1 so that the \long-term" equilibrium is attracting
and the system of di®erence equation converges to this equilibrium in an os-
cillatory way. The relationship between successive \short-term" equilibrium
payo®s is graphically represented by Bm;3 = 0 line which has a negative
slope less than unity, and the long-term equilibrium by point M3 where the
Bm;3 = 0 line crosses the 45 degrees line. Similarly to the previous case, D1;M
is bounded to the area between D1;N and D1;0 in order for our conditions to
be satis¯ed. As before, we use the Bm;3 = 0 line to map successive equilib-
rium payo®s on the vertical axis, and then use the 45 degrees line to transplot
them to the horizontal axis. Starting from D1;1 on the 45 degrees line, we
map D1;1 into D1;2 by moving upwards towards the Bm;3 = 0 line. In order to
map D1;2 into D1;3, ¯rstly we transplot D1;2 on the horizontal axis by moving
towards the 45 degrees line, and then downwards towards the Bm;3 = 0 line.
By continuing this process of graphical iteration, where the direction of iter-
ation is indicated by the arrows, successive equilibrium payo®s oscillate and
converge to the \long-term" steady-state equilibrium point M3. For example,
















therefore, the system of di®erence equations of the \short-term" equilibrium
payo®s rotates on a 2-period constant orbit, as it is illustrated in ¯gure 3. In
30this case, R is su±ciently high so that, as the system oscillates, D1;2 becomes
identical to D1;0. In general, D1;2m¡2 = D1;0 and D1;2m¡1 = D1;1 for any
m ¸ 2. Despite the fact that non of the conditions on fIt;M; St;Mg is vio-
lated, the \long-term" equilibrium can not be reached as successive equilib-
rium payo®s rotate on a constant orbit. For example, for ¼ = 0:75 and R = 3,








Consequently, for even higher values of R such R < R, successive equi-
librium payo®s also oscillate but the system of di®erence equations naturally
\explodes" away from the ¯xed point so that the upper boundary condition
is violated for m = 2, and therefore D1;2 will not feasible. In our example,
for any R > 3 when ¼ = 0:75, S2¸+1;2 becomes negative. This, however,
does not mean that another \short-term" payo® is not feasible. In fact, the
intermediary has su±cient liquidity to o®er even a higher allocation than the
one that it could o®er prior to any withdrawal shock. For such a high pay-
o® though, the binding sequential feasibility constraints are not satis¯ed as
S2¸+1;2 becomes negative. The highest feasible payo® that could be o®ered
in this case is D1;0 and the system returns to its initial allocation. In this
process, some of the extra resources are wasted and the system rotates on a
2-period constant orbit as is presented in ¯gure 3.
For high values of R, oscillations arise due to the e®ect of D1;0 on the
¯rst allocation D1;1 and the negative relationship between successive cycles'
payo®s. High values of R imply that the cost of ¯nancing excess withdrawals
out of new deposits at m = 1 is high, which implies a low D1;1, but this
cost becomes low at m = 2, which implies a high D1;2. Again, through it-
eration this e®ect is perpetuated between successive payo®s and diminishes
when the absolute value of the slope of Bm is less than unity so that we con-
verge to the \long-term" steady state, or increase when the absolute value of
the slope of Bm is greater than unity, so that we diverge from the ¯xed point.
From the above analysis we generalise our results in the following propo-
sition.
31Proposition 4.3 An in¯nitely-lived intergenerational bank with an illiquid
portfolio of assets can survive a crisis when external borrowing is available.
The cost of borrowing and the desired level of liquidity determine the transi-
tion path towards a feasible \long-term" steady state allocation.
In our analysis of this section we have consider only some particular val-
ues of ·m and ¿. Of course there are many other values of these the policy
parameters that the Central Bank can consider in order to ensure the ¯nan-
cial stability of the banking system during a crisis. However, for any other
set of values, the evolution of banks' liquidity during the crisis will be de-
scribed by a di®erent set of di®erence equations which will complicate the
problem. In addition, depending on the parameters of our model, this will
result di®erent ¯xed points and transition paths of \short-term" equilibrium
payo®s which is impossible to predict and analyse.
5 Banks' Financial Stability without a Cen-
tral Bank
In this section, we examine the evolution of banks' liquidity over the whole
period of the crisis in the presence of borrowing restrictions. In this case,
banks' inability to borrow implies that the liquidity of their portfolio of assets
will necessarily be periodic during bank run episodes, new ¯xed points will
emerge, and on the whole, banks' ¯nancial stability becomes unpredictable
during a crisis. We derive some general properties of these ¯xed points and
we identify the factors that a®ect the transition path of successive \short-
term" equilibria .
In the absence of a Central Bank that can perfectly smooth banks' liquid-
ity during the course of a crisis as we have analysed in the previous section,
new ¯xed points can arise in our model as potential \long-term" steady state
allocations. The general property 3.4 of our model implies that in this case,
the evolution of banks' liquidity depends on the timing of bank run episodes,
32which determine the available resources in each cycle. By substituting the
corresponding values of xm and ym into the budget constraint, incorporating
the incentive compatibility constraint, we derive a set of implicit functions of
di®erence equations (denoted as Bm(D1;m; D1;m¡1; R) = 0) that, depending
on whether a bank run occurs at a period of high or low liquidity, describe
the relationship between successive allocations. In this respect, new possible
¯xed points may exist. In particular, if the last run before the system settles
takes place at a period of high liquidity then, following our analysis in the
previous section, the \long-term" steady state is given by equation 4.2. On
the other hand, if the last run before the system settles happens at a period
in low liquidity, by substituting xm and ym as given by equation 3.10 into
the budget constraint and setting D1;m = D1;m¡1, we obtain the quadratic
function B(D1;m; R) = ¡(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ D1;m)D1;m, the solutions of which
(¯xed points) may constitute potential \long-term" equilibria if they satisfy
our conditions. We derive that this function has two ¯xed points; D1;M = R
which violates the nonnegativity condition on S2¸+1;M, since D1;M > D1;0
and may result to a misallocation of resources, and D1;M = 0 which vio-
lates the lower boundary since D1;N > 0. Despite the fact that these new
¯xed points violate the feasibility conditions, it is interesting to examine
their properties in order to characterise the behaviour of nearby orbits. By
di®erentiating the budget constraint with respect to successive equilibrium









R(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
¼(R ¡ 1) + 2(¼ + 2(1 ¡ ¼)R)
(5.1)
which is clearly greater than unity and therefore this is a repelling ¯xed point.









R(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
¼(R + 1)
(5.2)
From the above derivative we can observe that D1;M = 0 is an attracting
¯xed point since the absolute value of its derivative is less than one, provided
33that w1 > 0 holds.13 Hence, D1;M = 0 is another ¯xed point to which the
\short-term" steady states will converge if bank runs occur at periods of low
liquidity. Of course, it is not a feasible \long-term" steady state equilibrium
since in the process of convergence, during a particular run incident, new
generations will prefer to form a new bank and therefore the existing bank
will go \out of business".
Having identi¯ed a second ¯xed point that successive allocations may
converge to, we can characterise the general behaviour of the system around
these ¯xed points. Di®erentiating the implicit functions of the di®erence











since only the wm term of the budget constraint depends on D1;m¡1, and
correspondingly, only the vm term depends on D1;m. However, when we
evaluate the above derivative at the ¯xed point D1;M = D1;m = D1;m¡1,
from the balance budget constraint it follows that @wm=@D1;m¡1jD1; M =












Provided that the budget constraint, which is the di®erence between as-
sets and liabilities, balances at all times we can infer that at the \long-term"
steady state the constraint decreases monotonically in D1;M since higher equi-
librium payo®s correspond to higher liabilities, and therefore more resources
are required for the constraint to remain balanced (i.e. @BM=@D1;M < 0). In
a similar manner, the part of the budget constraint that captures the current
resources (endowments of the new generation) and liabilities of a particu-
13It is clear that the derivative in 5.2 is less than 1. Thus, it is su±cient to show that
is always greater than -1. By developing the inequality and substituting R for a0, we de-
rive that 0 < ¼ (D1;0 (1 + (1 ¡ ¼)D1;0) + 2)+w1D1;0
¡
¼2 + (1 ¡ ¼)
¡
D1;0 + (1 ¡ ¼)D2
1;0
¢¢
which always holds for w1 > 0.
34lar cycle (vm) decreases in D1;m as higher equilibrium payo®s correspond to






< 0).14 Therefore, the change in the budget
constraint relative the change in the current cycle's resources and liabilities,




> 0).15 From the above ex-
pression we derive an important property about the transition of successive
equilibrium payo®s around the ¯xed points we have identi¯ed.
Property 5.1 The system of di®erence equations does not \explode" monoton-








dently of the timing of runs (i.e. fxm; ymg).
In order to identify the factors that a®ect the nature of the ¯xed points
that arise in our model and provide some intuition about the behaviour of the
system away from these ¯xed points, we need to identify the factors that a®ect
the relationship between successive \short-term" steady state payo®s. For
this reason we use the expression for wm in terms of xm and ym which captures
the resources that remain available for investment from the previous cycle in
order to highlight the importance of the liquidity of the bank's portfolio at
the time period when runs take place. We have shown that the denominator
















Hence, the sign of the derivative described in equation 5.3 depends on
the e®ect that a change in the equilibrium payo® has on the resources that
become available for investment from the previous cycle's investment deci-
sions (wm). In a similar manner, the magnitude of the derivative depends
















A < 0, where @aM
@D1; M > 0.
15This can be shown by equations 4.3 and 5.2, when the last bank run before the system
settles occurs at a period of high and low liquidity, respectively.
35to a change in the equilibrium payo® on the assets and liabilities of the cur-
rent cycle (vm). From Property 3.4 it is clear that the values of xm and ym
depend on the timing of runs for the whole duration of the crisis. However,
despite the fact that D1;m¡1 can not be explicitly de¯ned when runs occur
at random time periods during a crisis, we can make inferences about the
sign of the above derivative during periods of high and low liquidity of the
bank's portfolio of assets, since the sequential budget constraints and the
investment in fSt;m; It;mg become stationary at t ¸ 3 for any cycle. In
this way, we can make inferences not only about the orbits around the \long-
term" equilibria, but also about the transition paths towards these equilibria.
Consider the last period of the cycle m¡1 during which the m run takes
place and therefore constitutes the initial period of the m cycle. As we have
seen in the previous section, during periods of high liquidity (odd periods),
the total resources available for investment, xm and ym, are given by equation
3.11 from which we compute that @xm
@D1; m¡1 < 0 and
@ym
@D1; m¡1 > 0.16 In this
case, the liquid assets which are used to ¯nance the excess withdrawals, and
consequently the resources available for investment at t = 0, are negatively
related to the previous cycle's equilibrium payo®. However, the investment in
the long-term technology that comes to maturity at t = 1 is positively related
to the previous cycle's equilibrium payo® as more resources are required to be
invested in the productive technology in order to maintain higher payments.
Substituting the above derivatives into equation 5.5 we derive that for

















¡ R(1 ¡ ¼)
Of course, we do not know the explicit value of D1;m¡1 since this depends
on the timing of withdrawal shocks that have happened in the past, but we
can make general inferences about the sign of the above derivative: since
16When a run happens at odd periods @xm
@D1; m¡1 = ¡
@am¡1








=(R ¡ 1) > 0.
36@am¡1
@D1; m¡1 > 0 for any surviving intermediary, its sign depends on the para-
meter values. For example, for any R not exceeding 2 the above derivative
will always be positive, whereas for any R no lower than 3 it will always be
negative.17 Hence, independently of the value of D1;m¡1, in the case when
runs take place in odd periods, the transition path of successive \short-term"
equilibrium payo®s of the surviving bank does not \explode" monotonically
away from a ¯xed point. In the case when the system settles at the ¯xed point
described in equation 4.2 so that runs around this equilibrium take place at
odd periods, nearby orbits may be attracted or repelled depending on the
responsiveness of ym due to a change in D1;m¡1 as opposed to that of xm and
am¡1, and therefore, on the values of our parameters. This is consistent with
our analysis in the previous section where Central Bank intervention guar-
antees that, independently of the timing of withdrawal shocks within each
cycle, bank's liquidity remains always at the level that it has during odd
periods. As we have seen from property 4.2 and in our numerical examples,
for a given ¼, when R = 2 the system monotonically converges to M2, and
for any other higher value less than 3 it oscillates and converges towards M3,
as we have illustrated in ¯gures 1 and 2.
On the other hand, if the run m takes place during a period of low liquidity
(even periods), the total resources available for investment, xm and ym, are
given by equation 3.10 where ym is independent of D1;m¡1, and @xm
@D1; m¡1 > 0
for a surviving bank since w1 is required to be positive18. Clearly, despite
the fact that the bank holds an illiquid portfolio of assets during the time
period that a run takes place and all excess withdrawals are ¯nanced by its
liquid assets, the resources that are available for investment at t = 0 are pos-
17Indeed, for R = 2 we derive that @wm
@D1; m¡1 = 3(¼ + 2(1 ¡ ¼)D1;m¡1)¡2(1¡¼) which
is always positive for a surviving bank since D1;m¡1 > D1;N > 1. However, for R = 3
the derivative becomes @wm
@D1; m¡1 = ¡2(¼ + 2(1 ¡ ¼)D1;m¡1) ¡ 3(1 ¡ ¼) which is always
negative.
18When a run happens during periods of low liquidity @xm






1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¼). Substituting R = a0, the expression will become 4(1 ¡ ¼)D1;m¡1 + w1¼ +
1 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)2D2
1;0, which can be simpli¯ed to 4(1 ¡ ¼)D1;m¡1 + w1 (1 + ¼ + (1 ¡ ¼)D1;0)
which is positive from the requirement that the bank survives the ¯rst run.
37itively related to the equilibrium payo® of the previous cycle. This is simply
due to the e®ect the change in equilibrium payo® has on the investment in
the productive technology. In other words, the higher the previous cycle's
equilibrium payo®, the greater the investment in the long-term technology
that is required for this payo® to be sustained, and therefore, the greater the
returns for distribution following a run. Hence, for any cycle m for which










¡ (1 ¡ ¼)R
The sign of the above derivative depends on whether the positive e®ect
on the resources that are available for investment at t = 0 is greater than the
negative e®ect of the standard liabilities of the previous cycle, due to a change
in the previous cycle's equilibrium payo®. However, we can not make posi-
tive conclusions about the sign of this derivative since these e®ects depend
on the parameters of our model and on the value of D1;m¡1 which in turn
depends on the timing of the withdrawal shocks that have happened in the
past. Hence, we can not make any inferences about the transition of succes-
sive allocations when a runs take place at periods of low liquidity away from
a ¯xed point. Property 5.1 describes only the behaviour of the system before
successive allocations settle at D1;M = 0 so that successive bank runs occur
at periods of low liquidity. As we have mentioned earlier, this ¯xed point
is not feasible and is associated with bank failure. In the extreme example
when we allow runs to take place only at periods of low liquidity, successive
payo®s may oscillate or move monotonically towards D1;M = 0 until, for a
given cycle m, xm becomes negative and the newborn generation forms a new








so that successive payo®s oscillate towards D1;M=0 but the bank \goes out
of business" at m = 2 since x2 becomes negative. In addition, when ¼ = 0:75







= 0:7777 so that successive payo®s monotonically
converge towards D1;M=0 but the bank \goes out of business" at m = 7 as
x7 becomes negative.
38Our analysis so far has only been concerned with explaining the transi-
tion between successive payo®s away from or close to the ¯xed points that we
have identi¯ed, provided that a series of run episodes (at least 2) occur during
periods of high or low liquidity between successive cycles. If, however, these
episodes occur at periods characterised by di®erent levels of liquidity, then
it becomes impossible to predict the relationship of these equilibrium alloca-
tions, and more importantly, the system may not converge to a ¯xed point.
In particular, the relationship of allocations away from the ¯xed points will
depend on our model's parameters and on the timing of past run events. This
determines the value of the previous cycle's equilibrium allocation, which in
turn through the process of iteration, a®ects the whole transition path. Fur-
thermore, the system can settle to a ¯xed point only if a series of successive
bank runs occur at periods characterised by the same level of liquidity. If
this is not the case then successive cycles' equilibrium payo®s will rotate on
constant orbits of n-cycles when the timing of the withdrawal shocks and the
model's parameters are such that D1;m = D1;m+n, for any n that belongs to
the set of nonnegative integers. Hence, it becomes evident that due to the
unpredictability that arises in the model, it is impossible to establish a com-
plete description of the e®ects that a crisis has on banks' ¯nancial stability
in the presence of borrowing restrictions.
Overall, we have shown that this erratic behaviour of banks' liquidity dur-
ing a crisis results from the periodicity of the investment in the two available
technologies that is required in order for the \short-term" steady-state pay-
o® to be o®ered to all the generations of agents within the same cycle. Our
results suggest that when borrowing restrictions are in place, intermediaries
may survive the crisis if they converge to a feasible \long-term" steady state
(or rotate on constant orbits of feasible allocations), or fail. This chaotic
behaviour that characterises the liquidity of banks' portfolios of assets can
threaten the soundness of a banking system that consists of solvent but illiq-
uid banks. However, when external borrowing is available, illiquid interme-
diaries can smooth the returns of their investment portfolio during periods
of ¯nancial distress and may survive a crisis. We have presented a particular
39case where the amount of resources borrowed and the cost of borrowing are
predetermined, and we analysed the transition paths that arise towards a
feasible \long-term" steady state payo® for di®erent values of the model's
parameters.
6 Discussion
In this paper we have developed a model that highlights the importance of
the liquidity of banks' portfolio, which determines their ability to survive
a crisis. External borrowing by a Central Bank acting as a Lender of Last
Resort by providing a discount window that enables transfer of resources
across time, and a minimum reserve requirement can provide the necessary
stability in the banking system during a period characterised by a series of
withdrawal shocks. In this respect, several assumptions of our model merit
some comments.
In our analysis, we have restricted our attention to steady state payo®s
within a cycle by treating each generation of agents the same. As we have
mentioned in the formulation of a representative bank's planning problem,
starting with a large number of identical banks, competition in the market
compels banks to perfectly compete on the terms of their deposit contract in
each period in order to attract new deposits. This does not only mean that
sequential budget constraints should hold with equality, as with the equal
treatment assumption in place, but also banks may have incentives to o®er
even higher payo®s to new generations under the premise that such high pay-
ments will drive their competitors out of the market and enable them in the
future periods to make monopoly pro¯ts. However, there are major concep-
tual and technical di±culties associated with this approach in determining
the whole strategy set in the formulation of banks' planning problem.19 This
19In this respect, Bencivenga and Smith (1991)[5] in developing an endogenous growth
model using an overlapping generations framework they viewed banks as coalitions of
agents of the same generation without prior liabilities or additional deposits by other
40interesting issue is a subject for future research.
Another important issue in our analysis is that bank runs are modelled
as massive withdrawals where all the depositors who hold an outstanding
liability, exercise their right to withdraw. The requirement of our model that
the bank survives the ¯rst run where all the excess withdrawals are satis¯ed
by liquid assets, therefore, imposes restrictions on our model parameters in
order to be satis¯ed. In other words, w1 is required to be positive where at
the same time is decreasing with respect to the returns of the long term tech-
nology. Therefore, for a given ¼, there is a small range of values that R can
take so that the bank will \remain in business" after the ¯rst run has taken
place so that excess withdrawals are relatively inexpensive to be ¯nanced by
new deposits. This requirement a®ects the behaviour of the system since it
determines the initial orbit of the system and consequently, through itera-
tion, the ¯nal outcome. However, these restrictions on the parameters can
be relaxed if we allow instead only a small fraction of impatient depositors
observe this extinsic factor that a®ects their beliefs about banks' solvency,
and consequently trigger the run (as in as in Allen and Gale (2000)[3]). Un-
der these circumstances, it is more likely that these excess withdrawals can
be met out of new deposits and therefore, our results can be extended for
higher values of R.
Moreover, an interesting issue that arises in our model concerns the os-
cillations of successive equilibrium payo®s and withdrawal behaviour of im-
patient agents. As we have seen, in case of oscillations, a run triggered by
one generation can lead to an improvement of welfare for future generations.
However, this behaviour is incompatible with the assumption of our model
that the bank does not renege on the initial contract. In other words, pa-
tient depositors do not have incentives to trigger a run and misrepresent
themselves as newborn agents of the ¯rst generation of the new cycle sim-
ply because the payment that will receive in the last period of their life is
identical to the payment that impatient depositors of the same generation
generations of agents.
41had received. Provided that the incentive compatibility constraint binds,
\strategic" withdrawals do not arise in our model, irrespectively of whether
generations of the new cycle will receive a higher equilibrium payo®.
The ¯nal point concerns our approach to banks' ¯nancial stability. We
view bank runs unanticipated withdrawal shocks where any external event
that triggers depositors to belief that other depositors will withdraw their
deposits results in a run. An interesting extension of our paper would be to
model explicitly the mechanism that causes agents' beliefs to change as in





Proof of Proposition 3.2
This proof is a generalisation of Qi's (1994)[19] earlier work.
The sequential budget constraints can be written as:
At t = 0 : I0;m · xm ¡ S0;m (A.1)
At t = 1 : I1;m · 1 ¡ ¼D1;m¡1 + ym R + S0;m ¡ S1;m (A.2)
At t = 2 : I2;m · 1 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m¡1 + I0;mR + S1;m ¡ S2;m (A.3)
: I2;m · 1 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m¡1 + R(xm ¡ S0;m) + S1;m ¡ S2;m
At t = 3 : I3;m · 1 ¡ am + I1;m R + S2;m ¡ S3;m (A.4)
: I3;m · 1 ¡ am + R(1 ¡ ¼D1;m¡1 + ymR) + R(S0;m ¡ S1) + S2;m ¡ S3;m
At t = 4 : I4;m · 1 ¡ am + I2;mR + S3;m ¡ S4;m (A.5)
: I4;m · 1 ¡ am + R(1 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m¡1)
+ R
2 (xm ¡ S0;m) + R(S1;m ¡ S2;m) + S3;m ¡ S4;m
At t = 5 : I5;m · 1 ¡ am + I3;mR + S4;m ¡ S5;m (A.6)
: I5;m · 1 ¡ am + R(1 ¡ am)
+ R
2 (1 ¡ ¼ D1;m¡1 + ym R) + R
2 (S0;m ¡ S1;m) + R(S2;m ¡ S3;m) + S4;m ¡ S5;m
The above constraints can be described in two sequences for ¸ the set of
positive integers for t ¸ 3.





¸¡i(1 ¡ am) + R




¸+1¡i (S2i¡2;m ¡ S2i¡1;m)
and





¸¡i(1 ¡ am) + R
¸(1 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)D2;m¡1)
+ R




¸+1¡i (S2i¡1;m ¡ S2i;m)
Suppose that the payo® (D1;m;D2;m) is budget feasible; there exist some
nonnegative fIt;mg and fSt;mg such as the above sequential budget con-
straints hold.
Take St;m ¸ 0. It follows that:




¸¡i(1 ¡ am) + R






¸+1¡i (S2i¡2;m ¡ S2i;m) (A.9)
Simplifying the above expression, we obtain:




¸¡i(1 ¡ am) + R
¸ (2 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ am¡1 + R(ym + xm))











¸ (2 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ am¡1 + R(xm + ym))
where the last inequality obtains because fStg ¸ 0 is taken as given.
46Taking the limit as ¸ approaches in¯nity, it follows:
lim
¸!1







+ 2 ¡ ¼D1;m ¡ am¡1 + R(xm + ym)
¶
(A.11)
By contradiction, if 3.3 does not hold then lim¸!1 (I2¸+1;m + I2¸+2;m) =
¡1, implying that either I2¸+1;m or I2¸+2;m (or both) is negative for a large
¸. That is, there is no nonnegative I2¸+1;m and I2¸+2;m that makes the
sequential budget constraints true. This is contradictory to the assump-
tion of budget feasibility. Therefore, a budget-feasible steady-state payo®
(D1;m; D2;m) must satisfy the condition 3.3.






0 for t = 0 and t = 2¸;¸ 2 Z++
1 + ymR ¡ ¼D1;m¡1 for t = 1





xm for t = 0
2(am¡1)
R¡1 ¡ 1 for t = 2¸;¸ 2 Z++
0 for t = 2¸ + 1;¸ 2 Z+
We can observe that this set of conditions on fIt; Stg also satis¯es the
sequential budget constraints with equality but violates the nonnegativity
condition since when S2¸+1;m > 0 it follows that I2¸;m < 0 and vice versa.
For this reason is ignored
Proof of Lemma 4.1
From the de¯nition of this case S1;M = ymR ¡ ¼D1;M > 0. In addition,
fxM;yMg > 0 so that I0;M = xM > 0 and I2¸;M > 0. The last condition on
47the investment technologies for the \long-term" steady-state equilibrium to
be feasible is that S2¸+1;M = R¡aM is positive. Hence, is su±cient to show
that D1;0 > D1;M which implies that a0 > aM, where a0 = R.
Evaluating the general budget constraint for the \long-term" steady state
at D1;0, we obtain:
BM(D1;0; R) = R
2 ¡ (1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)D
2
1;0 ¡ R(¼ + (1 ¡ ¼))D1;0
where BM(D1;M; R) = 0 is strictly decreasing and concave in D1;M > 0.
Hence, if D1;0 > D1;M then we need to show that BM(D1;0; R) < 0. Indeed
by substituting for a0 = ¼D1;0 + (1 ¡ ¼)D2
1;0 into the above expression, this
can be simpli¯ed to:
BM(D1;0; R) = R
2 ¡ Ra0 + (1 ¡ ¼)D
2
1;0 ¡ R(1 ¡ ¼)D1;0
and from a0 = R, it follows:
BM(D1;0; R) = (1 ¡ ¼)D1;0 (D1;0 ¡ R) < 0
since D1;0 < R. Hence, from the monotonicity of BM(D1;M; R) = 0 in
D1;M it follows that D1;0 > D1;M, or equivalently a0 > aM, which implies
that S2¸+1;M = R ¡ aM > 0.
Di®erentiating the general budget constraint the \long-term" steady state























1;M + D1;M ¡ 2R
2(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)D1;M + R
¶




dR > 0 indicating that the \long-term" steady-state equi-
librium payo® is increasing in R.
Proof of Property 4.2
In order to determine the sign of the the derivative of equation 4.3 with re-
spect to R, we simply focus on the derivatives numerator and denominator
with respect to R, respectively. If the the later has a di®erent sign from
the former we can conclude that the sign of the whole derivative. Note that
D1;M depends also on R.
Di®erentiating the nominator with respect to R we obtain:
1 + 2(1 ¡ ¼)
µ








































1 + 2(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1) ¡
p
1 + 4(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
´
2(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
p
1 + 4(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1)
< 0
where 1 + 2(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1) >
p
1 + 4(1 ¡ ¼)(R ¡ 1).
Therefore, the derivative of the denominator with respect to R is negative,
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